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Two roads diverged in a yellow wood,
And sorry I could not travel both
And be one traveler, long I stood
And looked down one as far as I could
To where it bent in the undergrowth
Robert Frost, The Road Not Taken
This paper articulates in formal terms a crucial distinction concerning future
contingents, the distinction between what is true about the future and what
is reasonable to believe about the future. Its key idea is that the branching
structures that have been used so far to model truth can be employed to
define an epistemic property, credibility, which we take to be closely related to
knowledge and assertibility, and which is ultimately reducible to probability.
As a result, two kinds of claims about future contingents — one concerning
truth, the other concerning credibility — can be smoothly handled within a
single semantic framework.
1 introduction
The philosophical disputes about future contingents — sentences that concern
future events that are neither determined to occur nor determined not to
occur — hinge on the metaphysical implications of bivalence. The main views
that have been advanced differ precisely as to the question whether future
contingents are either true or false. Aristotelians claim that future contingents
are neither true nor false because they are true in some possible futures and
false in other possible futures. Peirceans claim that future contingents are
false because they are not true in all possible futures. Ockhamists claim that
future contingents are either true or false because they are either true or false
in the actual future. In each of the three cases, the analysis provided applies
uniformly to all future contingents, so it turns out that all future contingents
are alike in some sense.1
Yet there is an important sense in which future contingents are not all
alike: some of them express contents that is reasonable to believe, others do
not. If you normally eat breakfast every morning, your breakfast supplies
are safely stored in the kitchen, and you have no intention to change your
usual routine, then you may reasonably believe what follows:
1 Aristotelianism so understood is advocated in Thomason [28], Belnap, Perloff, and Xu [19],
MacFarlane [16], among other works. Peirceanism goes back to Prior [23], and is defended in
Todd [29]. Ockhamism is advocated in Øhrstrøm [21], Rosenkranz [24], Iacona [8], Malpass and
Wawer [18], among other works.
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(1) I will have breakfast tomorrow
By contrast, the negation of (1) does not have the same property:
(2) I will not have breakfast tomorrow
Today your confidence in (1) is definitely high. Of course, there is a remote
possibility that an earthquake destroys your house just before you wake up.
But the mere existence of that possibility does not prevent your belief in (1),
and your disbelief in (2), from being reasonable.2
The apparent difference between (1) and (2) is clearly not explainable in
terms of truth values. Consider the following sentences, which do not exhibit
such a difference:
(3) The coin will land head
(4) The coin will land tails
As far as truth values are concerned, (1) and (2) are exactly like (3) and (4), on
any view of future contingents. According to Aristotelianism, both (1) and
(2) lack truth value. According Peirceanism, they are both false. According
to Ockhamism, one of them is true and the other is false. In each of the three
cases, what holds for (1) and (2) also holds for (3) and (4).
The difference between (1) and (2) is rather a difference of epistemic value.
That is, it seems that (1) is better than (2) in some epistemic sense in which
(3) is not better than (4). We will call credibility this epistemic value. To say
that (1) is highly credible is to say that it is highly reasonable to believe (1).
Similarly, to say that the credibility of (1) is higher than the credibility of (2)
is to say that believing (1) is more reasonable than believing (2).3
The distinction between truth and credibility emerges clearly when one
considers retrospective assessments of past predictions. Imagine that you
utter (1) today, and that tomorrow an earthquake destroys your house before
breakfast time. Tomorrow, amid the ruins of your house, it seems correct to
say that your prediction was false. But this does not prevent it from being
reasonable. So it seems consistent to say both that yesterday it was reasonable
for you to believe that you would have breakfast today and that as a matter
of fact you did not have breakfast today. A prediction can be highly credible
but false.
The opposite can also happen, of course. Imagine that you utter (2) today
just because some magician hypnothized you to say that sequence of words,
and that the earthquake destroys your house as before. In this case, from
the vantage point of tomorrow, it seems correct to say that your prediction
was true. But this does not prevent it from being ungrounded. So it seems
consistent to say both that yesterday it was not reasonable for you to believe
that you would not have breakfast today and that as a matter of fact you did
not have breakfast today. A prediction can be true in spite of being hardly
credible.
A slightly more nuanced example is the following. Suppose that, on
Monday, the estimated probability that it rains on Wednesday is 50%, but
that, as the meteorological situation evolves, on Tuesday the estimated
probability that it rains on Wednesday is 90%. Suppose also that the following
predictions are made on Monday and Tuesday respectively:
2 Similar examples are discussed in Barnes and Cameron [2], Hattiangadi and Besson [6], and
Iacona [10], among other works.
3 The term ‘credibility’ so understood clearly differs from the term ‘credence’, which is mostly
used descriptively to indicate degree of belief. While it makes perfect sense to apply adjectives
such as ‘rational’ or ‘justified’ to ‘credence’, it would be redundant to apply them to ‘credibility’.
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(5) It will rain in two days
(6) It will rain tomorrow
It seems correct to say that if the second prediction is true, the first was true
as well. But this does not mean that if the second prediction is reasonable,
the first was equally reasonable. Even though (6) as uttered on Tuesday is
highly credible, the credibility of (5) as uttered on Monday was definitely
lower.
This paper outlines a formal account of the distinction between truth and
credibility. Section 2 provides a first informal characterization of credibility.
Section 3 defines a standard branching time semantics. Sections 4 and 5
set out the definitions of truth and credibility by relying on that semantics.
Section 6 draws attention to some main logical implications. Finally, section 7
explains how the account outlined may shed light on some important issues
concerning knowledge and assertibility.
2 some basic assumptions
Let us start with four basic assumptions that we regard as minimal constraints
on an adequate account of credibility. The first assumption — the gradability
constraint — is that credibility is a gradable property. In ordinary talk, it
is quite common to express comparative epistemic judgments about claims
or conjectures that concern future events. For example, one can say that
a certain future event is more likely than another, or that the evidence for
believing that it will occur is stronger than the evidence for believing that
it will not occur. This suggests that future contingents can have different
degrees of credibility.
In our account, credibility values will be assigned to formulas in such a
way that, for any formula α, the credibility of α is indicated by a real number
n such that 0 ≤ n ≤ 1, where 0 is the lowest point in the scale, representing
no credibility at all, and 1 is the highest point, representing full credibility.
The sum of the value of α and the value of ∼α will be 1 for any assignment,
as is plausible to expect. So, the negation of a formula with credibility 1 will
be 0, and the negation of a formula with credibility 0 will be 1.
The second assumption — the finiteness constraint — concerns the kind of
subjects that we expect to make credibility judgments. We will restrict con-
sideration to finite subjects, that is, subjects with finite memory, information,
representational capacities, and so on. Accordingly, we will assume that a
credibility judgment can be made by examining a finite number of options.
It would be highly implausible to require that, in order to assess a prediction
about the future, an infinite number of possibilities is taken into account, for
no mundane agent has the cognitive resources to do so. Moreover, there are
practical reasons to prefer finite sets of options over infinite sets of options.
The former prove more apt to implementation in engineered computational
systems, where having a finite number of items to manipulate is usually a
crucial element.
Historically, the question whether future contingents are either true or
false has been extensively discussed in connection with the issue of divine
foreknowledge. Although we recognize the intrinsic theoretical interest of
this issue, we think that modelling the cognitive behaviour of agents with
limited epistemic resources is no less important than investigating the idea
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of an omniscient being. So, here we will stick with the finiteness constraint,
and reason as if there is no God.4
In the structures that we will adopt as models, the options to be examined
are represented as branches of a tree, each of which stands for a possible
continuation of the present state of affairs. So, in accordance with the
finiteness constraint, we will restrict consideration to trees with a finite
number of branches. This restriction warrants that the level of idealization of
the formal account is not too high, which we take to be a virtue.
The third assumption — the deduction constraint — is that credibility is
deductively closed in the following sense: whenever a sentence logically
follows from another sentence, its credibility must be at least as high as
the credibility of that sentence. For example, the inference from (6) to the
following sentence must preserve its degree of credibility:
(7) Either it will rain tomorrow or it will snow tomorrow
The obvious plausibility of this constraint is due to its weakness. Deductive
closure so understood can be distinguished from a stronger principle accord-
ing to which any logical consequence of a credible set of sentences must be
credible. The latter principle, which would be more contentious, has been
widely discussed under the label of ‘deductive closure’ in connection with
the notion of rational belief.5
Note that the deduction constraint entails that logical truths are fully
credible, for a logical truth logically follows from any sentence. Thus, the
formula that represents the following sentence must have value 1:
(8) Either it will rain tomorrow or it will not rain tomorrow
Since a contradiction amounts to the negation of a logical truth, we also get
that contradictions are not credible at all. Thus, the formula that represents
the following sentence must have value 0:
(9) It will rain tomorrow and it will not rain tomorrow
The fourth assumption — the probability constraint — concerns the relation
between credibility and probability, where the latter is understood as objec-
tive chance. It seems reasonable to conjecture that the credibility of a claim
about the future is directly proportional to its objective chance. For example,
(1) is highly probable, and it is natural to expect that its high credibility is
somehow related to this fact. Similarly the probability of (2) is very low, and
it is natural to expect that its low credibility is somehow related to this fact.
So, we will assume that an adequate account of credibility must be consistent
with this conjecture, independently of any further question concerning the
nature of objective chance.
As it will turn out, our account of credibility satisfies the probability
constraint insofar as it entails that credibility is itself a kind of probability. We
take this to be a remarkable result, because it shows a convergence between
a coherent formal treatment of the epistemology of future contingents and
an independently grounded mathematical theory.
4 Øhrstrøm and Hasle [22] provides a detailed historical reconstruction of the debate on future
contingents. Todd and Rabern [31] is a recent work on the relation between future contingents
and temporal omniscience.
5 The stronger principle is suggested in Hempel [7] as a necessary condition of rationality. Kyburg
[12], p. 55, labels ‘weak deduction principle’ a condition of the kind adopted here.
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3 branching time semantics
Our formal semantics relies on two main ideas that are widely shared in the
debate on future contingents, and that we take to be theoretically neutral.
The first is that the logical form of sentences that talk about future times
are adequately formalized by using the metric tense operator Fn. For our
purposes it will suffice to take days as time units, so that Fn is read as ‘It will
be the case n days from now that’. So we will adopt a language L defined as
follows:
definition 1
1 Every sentence letter is a formula;
2 If α is a formula ∼α is a formula;
3 If α and β are formulas, (α ∧ β) is a formula;
4 If α and β are formulas, (α ∨ β) is a formula;
5 If α and β are formulas, (α ⊃ β) is a formula;
6 If α is a formula, for any n, Fnα is a formula.
It is easy to see how L can be enriched by adding further tense operators,
such as Pn, or the usual modal operators  and ♦. However, definition 1 will
suffice for the purposes at hand.
The second idea is that a branching time model provides an adequate
representation of the spectrum of future possibilities that are open at a given
moment. A branching time model is usually defined as a triple 〈M,<, V〉,
where 〈M,<〉 is a frame formed by a non-empty set of moments and a strict
partial order on M, and V is a valuation function that assigns truth values to
atomic formulas relative to moment-history pairs. A moment-history pair
m/h is a point of evaluation constituted by a moment m and a history h —
a maximal linearly ordered subset of M — such that m ∈ h. The models
that we will adopt are very similar, in that we only add a further item in
order to account for the fact that different possible futures may have different
degrees of proximity to the present state of affairs insofar as some of them
may be more likely than others. This additional item, which we will call a
proximity assignment over 〈M,<〉, is a function that assigns proximity values
to histories relative to moments. More precisely, if Hm is the set of histories
that go through m — assuming that Hm is finite for the reasons explained
in section 2 — each history in Hm is assigned a real number greater than 0
in such a way that the total sum of the values assigned is 1. Intuitively, the
value that the function takes for each history in Hm indicates how likely is
that history at m.6
The models that we will adopt are thus defined as follows:
definition 2 A model for L is a quadruple 〈M,<, V, P〉, where M is a
non-empty set, < is a strict partial order on M, V is a function that assigns 1
6 Note that the notion of proximity assignment does not require the assumption that Hm is finite.
This notion can easily be adapted to a countably infinite set of histories by employing sigma-
additivity and defining their total likelihood as the (countably infinite) sum of the likelihoods of
the histories in the set. Note also that this is not the only way to provide a measure of likelihood
of the kind required. An alternative way is to assign absolute proximity values to histories,
obtain the proximity value of each moment m as the sum of the proximity values of the histories
that go through m, and then define the proximity value of a history h relative to a moment m by
conditionalizing on m.
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or 0 to each sentence letter of L relative to each m/h, and P is a proximity
assignment over 〈M,<〉.
Let P(Hm) be the sum of the values that P assigns to the histories in Hm,
that is, P(Hm) = ∑h∈Hm P(h) = 1. When P assigns the same value to every
h in Hm — so that P(h) = P(Hm)/|Hm| — we say that P is equitable relative
to m. Similarly, when P is equitable relative to every m in a model, we call
equitable the model itself. Equitable models involve a simplification that
may profitably be adopted whenever no difference of likelyhood is expected
between the possible futures considered. For example, if the alternative to be
represented is between two possible outcomes of the flip of a coin, as in the
case of (3) and (4), it is plausible to imagine two histories that have the same
proximity value relative to the moment of evaluation.7
The notion of truth at a moment-history pair that we will adopt is defined
exactly as in traditional branching time models, for the additional item that
characterize our models make no difference with respect to this notion.
definition 3
1 If α is atomic, [α]m/h = 1 iff V(α)m/h = 1;
2 [∼ α]m/h = 1 iff [α]m/h = 0;
3 [α ∧ β]m/h = 1 iff [α]m/h = 1 and [β]m/h = 1;
4 [α ∨ β]m/h = 1 iff [α]m/h = 1 or [β]m/h = 1;
5 [α ⊃ β]m/h = 1 iff [α]m/h = 0 or [β]m/h = 1;
6 [Fnα]m/h = 1 iff m′ is n units after m along h and [α]m′/h = 1.
Figure 1 provides an illustration. Here we suppose that each of the ten
moments m1 −m10 is one unit after m0, and that these moments are located
in ten distinct histories that overlap until m0, namely, h1 − h10. In this case
[F1 p]m0/h1 = 1, because [p]m1/h1 = 1, and the same goes for any other history
in which p becomes true. Instead, [F1 p]m0/h7 = 0, because [p]m7/h7 = 0.
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Validity and logical consequence are defined accordingly.
definition 4  α iff [α]m/h = 1 for every m/h in every model.
definition 5 β1, . . . , βn  α iff  (β1∧, . . . ,∧βn) ⊃ α.
For example, from definition 4 we get that  F1 p ∨∼F1 p, because [F1 p ∨
∼F1 p]m/h = 1 for every m/h in every model. From definition 5 we get that
F1 p  F1 p ∨ F1q, because  F1 p ⊃ (F1 p ∨ F1q).
The semantics just outlined has been adopted by several authors as a basic
building block of more sophisticated formal accounts of tensed sentences.
Although most of these accounts take for granted that the histories in the
model represent metaphysically possible courses of events, the semantics
itself is neutral with respect to the distinction between metaphysical and
epistemic possibility, and we will use it to model the latter, assuming that
histories represent epistemically possible courses of events. Of course, what
is epistemically possible can also be metaphysically possible. So, our use
of branching tree models is consistent with the hypothesis that there is a
7 The idea of a measure of likelyhood is not new, see for example Konur, Fisher and Scheve [25],
pp. 65-68.
8 The definition of truth at a moment-history pair goes back to Prior [23], pp. 126-127.
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Figure 1
correspondent plurality of metaphysically possible courses of events. But it
does not depend on that hypothesis, and does not imply any specific view
about the nature or the ontology of time.
4 definition of truth
The semantics outlined in the previous section provides a technical notion,
truth at a moment-history pair, which has no counterpart at the intuitive level.
Now we will explain how this technical notion can be used to define truth
and credibility, two properties that we take to apply to sentences relative to
moments. Using a distinction introduced by MacFarlane and adopted by
other authors in the debate on future contingents, definition 3 provides the
semantics proper, while the definitions of truth and credibility set out in this
section and in the next belong to the postsemantics.9
In order to define truth, we will rely on a specific view of future contin-
gents, Ockhamism. According to Ockhamism, future contingents are either
true or false, although they are neither determinately true nor determinately
false. Their truth or falsity depends on what happens in the actual history.
That is,
(T) The truth value of α at m is the value that α has at m relative to the
actual history.
The thought that underlies (T) is that, when a future contingent is uttered
at m, the utterance involves reference to one in particular among the many
courses of events that are possible at m, the actual course of events. Therefore,
a formal semantics in which truth is defined for a set of histories can provide
a characterization of plain truth to the extent that one of the histories in the
set represents that course of events. The truth value of α at m, indicated as
T(α)m, can be defined as follows, assuming that one of the histories in Hm is
the actual history:
definition 6 T(α)m = [α]m/h, where h is the actual history.
9 MacFarlane [16], pp. 329-330.
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Since α can take either 1 or 0 at m/h, it follows that either T(α)m = 1 or
T(α)m = 0. Thus, every sentence of the form Fn p, such as (1), is either true
or false.10
It is important to note that, in the context of the present discussion, the
choice of definition 6 is purely instrumental. Our distinction between truth
and credibility does not essentially depend on this definition, and could
equally be phrased by adopting a non-Ockhamist post-semantics. At least
two conceivable alternatives deserve mention. One is the supervaluationist
definition of truth, which expresses a widely accepted construal of Aris-
totelianism: α is true at m — or supertrue — just in case [α]m/h = 1 for
every h, α is false at m — or superfalse — just in case [α]m/h = 0 for every
h, and α is neither true nor false at m otherwise.11 The other conveys the
core idea of Peirceanism: α is true at m just in case [α]m/h = 1 for every
h, and false otherwise.12 In the first case future contingents turn out to be
neither true nor false, in the second they turn out to be false. But at any rate,
what matters here is not the truth values themselves. In order to draw the
distinction between truth and credibility, all that is needed is that epistemic
values vary independently of truth values, however the latter are defined.
5 definition of credibility
Our definition of credibility is somehow analogous to the supervaluationist
definition of truth. The analogy lies in the fact that we take the credibility
of α at m to be determined by the values of α at m relative to the histories
that pass through m. The crucial difference is that credibility is quantitative
rather than qualitative. Let Am be the subset of Hm that contains exactly the
histories in which α holds, that is, {h : [α]m/h = 1}. The key idea of our
definition is the following:
(C) The credibility value of α at m is determined by the proportion between
Am and Hm.
In order to make this idea precise, it must be taken into account that the
histories in Hm can have different degrees of proximity, that is, the function
P in the model can assign different numbers to them. The credibility value
of α at m, indicated as C(α)m, is thus defined as the sum of the proximity
values of the members of Am:
definition 7 C(α)m = P(Am)
Here P(Am) is the sum of the values that P assigns to the histories in
Am, that is, ∑h∈Am P(h). Since P(Hm) = 1 and Am ⊆ Hm, we have that
P(Am) ≤ 1. This allows for two limiting cases. One is that in which
P(Am) = 0 because Am = ∅. The other is that in which P(Am) = 1 because
Am = Hm. As a result, 0 ≤ C(α)m ≤ 1.13
Note that, when P is equitable relative to m, definition 7 boils down to the
following equation: C(α)m is the ratio of |Am| to |Hm|. Suppose for example
10 This idea has been developed in different ways in Iacona [9], Cariani and Santorio [5], Malpass
and Wawer [18].
11 Supervaluationism goes back to Van Fraassen [32] and Thomason [28].
12 This version of Peirceanism differs from the theory that is called ‘Peircean’ in Prior [23], because
it is phrased at the level of post-semantics. In order to have a Peircean semantics, one should
change clause 6 of definition 3 and introduce a quantification over histories there.
13 It is worth mentioning that, if one were to adjust clause 6 of definition 3 in the way explained
in footnote 12, one would end up with the unpalatable result that every future-tense sentence
has credibility 0 or 1, without intermediate values. Todd [30] discusses the implications of this
result.
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that Hm contains ten histories, and that each of them has proximity 0.1. If α
is true in nine of these histories, it credibility value according to definition
7 is 0.9. This is nothing but the ratio 9/10, that is, the number of histories
in which α holds divided by the total number of histories. In the examples
below, we will take equitability for granted in order to keep things as simple
as possible.
Although credibility is a gradable property, unlike supertruth, when it
comes to assigning the maximum or the minimum value, definition 7 behaves
exactly like the supervaluationist definition: α has value 1 at m if and only
if it holds in all the histories passing through m, and it has value 0 at m if
and only if it holds in no history passing through m. Another important
analogy is that the truth-functional connectives behave classically at the level
of semantics proper but non-classically at the level of postsemantics. In
particular, just like a disjunction can be supertrue even though neither of its
disjuncts is supertrue, a disjunction can be credible even though neither of
its disjunct is credible. For example, the credibility of (7) and (8) does not
distribute over their disjuncts. The case of conjunction is different, though,
for while α ∧ β is supertrue whenever α and β are supertrue, the credibility
of α ∧ β can be lower than that of α and β taken separately. This failure of
aggregation is very plausible, we submit. For example, the credibility of (1)
and (5) may easily be higher than the credibility of their conjunction.
The distinction between T and C can be illustrated by recalling figure
1. Let F1 p stand for (1) and m0 be today. Since [F1 p]m0/h1 = 1, and the
same goes for the other eight histories in which p becomes true, we get
that C(F1 p)m0 = 0.9. Suppose that h7 is the actual history, as in the unlikely
scenario in which an earthquake destroys your house. Then, T(F1 p)m0 = 0.
So, tomorrow it is correct to say that (1) was false as uttered today, in spite
of the fact that (1) was highly credible.
Now let ∼F1 p stand for (2). Since [∼F1 p]m0/h1 = 0, and the same goes for
the other eight histories in which p becomes true, we get that C(∼F1 p)m0 =
0.1. Suppose again that h7 is the actual history. Then, T(∼F1 p)m0 = 1. So,
tomorrow it is correct to say that (2) was true as uttered today, in spite of the
fact that its credibility was very low.
In order to deal with the other example considered in section 1, we need a
more complex diagram. Figure 2 represents three temporal units rather than
two. Suppose that m0 is Monday, and that m1 and m2 are two alternative
Tuesdays, each of which leads to ten possible Wednesdays. Let F2 p stand for
(5) and F1 p stand for (6). In this case we get that, if the actual history is one
of those where p becomes true, then T(F1 p)m1 = T(F2 p)m0 = 1. This means
that the two predictions made by uttering (5) and (6) are equivalent. Instead,
they do not have the same credibility, because C(F1 p)m1 = 0.9, whereas
C(F2 p)m0 = 0.5. The credibility of rain on Wednesdays increases as we move
from Monday to Tuesday.
6 logical consequence and logical truth
From what has been said so far it turns out that the definition of credibility
satisfies the first two constraints stated in section 2, the gradability constraint
and the finiteness constraint. So it remains to be shown that it satisfies the
other two constraints, the deduction constraint and the probability constraint.





fact 1 If α  β, then, for every m, C(α)m ≤ C(β)m.
Proof. Assume that α  β. If Am is the subset of Hm in which α holds, and
Bm is the subset of Hm in which β holds, then Am ⊆ Bm. It follows that
P(Am) ≤ P(Bm), hence that C(α)m ≤ C(β)m.
From fact 1 we get that C(F1 p)m ≤ C(F1 p ∨ F1q)m for every m, since
F1 p  F1 p ∨ F1q, as noted in section 3. This is a principled reason for saying
that the inference from (6) to (7) preserves credibility.
Note that fact 1 does not entail that, for any finite set of formulas Γ and
any formula α, if Γ  α, then α is at least as credible as each member of Γ.
To see that this stronger closure principle does not hold it suffices to think
about what has been said about the failure of aggregation. If Γ = {β, γ}
and α = β ∧ γ, there is no guarantee that the credibility of α is at least as
high as that of the members of Γ. What does hold instead is that, if Γ  α,
then α is at least as credible as the conjunction of the members of Γ. This is a
direct corollary of fact 1, given that if Γ  α, then α logically follows from the
conjunction of the members of Γ.14
The following fact shows that logical truths are fully credible:
fact 2 If  α, then, for every m, C(α)m = 1.
Proof. Assume that  α. Then, by definition 4, Am = Hm, so P(Am) = P(Hm).
Therefore, C(α)m = 1.
From fact 2 we get that C(F1 p∨∼F1 p)m = 1, since  F1 p∨∼F1 p, as noted
in section 3. So, (8) is fully credible. Moreover, we get that C(F1 p∧∼F1 p) = 0,
for  ∼(F1 p ∧ ∼F1 p), which entails that C(∼(F1 p ∧ ∼F1 p)) = 1. So, (9) is
not credible at all.
In order to show that our definition of credibility satisfies the probability
constraint, we will rely on the standard definition of probability function.
definition 8 A function F from a language to the set of real numbers is a
probability function if and only if the following holds for any two formulas α
and β in the language:
1. F(α) ≥ 0; (Non-negativity)
2. F(α) = 1 if α is logically true; (Normalization)
3. F(α ∨ β) = F(α) + F(β) if α ∧ β is logically false. (Additivity)
From definition 7 it turns out that C is a probability function, as it assigns
values to formulas relative to moments in accordance with conditions 1-3:
fact 3 C is a probability function.
Proof. Let α and β be formulas of L, and consider any m. Non-negativity
holds because C(α)m ≥ 0. Normalization holds by fact 2. Finally, Additivity
holds for the following reason. Let Am and Bm be the subsets of Hm in which
α and β hold respectively, so that Am ∪ Bm is the subset of Hm in which
α ∨ β holds. If α ∧ β is logically false, Am ∩ Bm = ∅, hence P(Am ∪ Bm) =
P(Am) + P(Bm). Therefore, C(α ∨ β)m = C(α)m + C(β)m.
14 As Kyburg [12] shows, p. 59, the stronger principle considered is obtained precisely by adding
aggregation to our weak principle.
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This fact shows that credibility is a kind of probability, in that it obeys the
laws of probability theory. So, the relation between credibility and objective
chance may be understood as a relation between two kinds of probability.
Just as credibility values can be assigned to sentences relative to moments,
the same goes for chance values, no matter how the latter are understood.
For example, it is reasonable to expect that the pretheoretical judgements
about the credibility of (1)-(4) invoked in section 1 are based on our beliefs
about the objective chance of (1)-(4). To the extent that the representation of
possible futures provided by a branching time model — and more specifically
its proximity assigment — is assumed to be accurate in terms of objective
chance, it turns out that credibility is directly proportional to objective chance,
as is plausible to expect.
One way to spell out this accuracy assumption is to define the relation
between credibility and objective chance in terms of the Principal Principle
suggested by Lewis. For any α and m, let X be the proposition that the
chance of α at m is x, let E be a proposition compatible with X that expresses
the present total evidence, and let C(α|XE)m be the credibility at m of α
conditional on X and E. The Principal Principle says that C(α|XE)m = x. So,
for example, if α is (3), m is the present moment, and X is the proposition
that the chance of heads is 0.5, then the credibility of α at m conditional on
that proposition and on the present total evidence is 0.5. In the limiting case
in which it is certain that the chance of heads is 0.5, that is, the credibility
of X given E is 1, the unconditional credibility of α at m is 0.5. This is one
way of explaining how our judgements about credibility are guided by our
beliefs about objective chance. In Lewis’ words,
If your present degrees of belief are reasonable — or at least
if they come from some reasonable initial credence function by
condizionalizing on your total evidence — then the Principal
Principle applies. Your credences about outcomes conform to
your firm beliefs and your partial beliefs about chances. Then the
latter guide your life because the former do. The greater chance
you think the ticket has of winning, the greater should be your
degree of belief that it will win.15
7 knowledge and assertibility
This last section is intended to show how the formal treatment of credibility
provided in the foregoing sections may shed light on some important issues
concerning knowledge and assertibility. As is well known, knowledge and
assertibility are hard to define. A detailed discussion of their nature would
go far beyond the scope of the present work. Here we will just draw attention
to some straightforward connections between credibility, knowledge, and
assertibility, while remaining neutral on the definitions of knowledge and
assertibility.16
First of all, it seems indisputable that knowledge entails credibility. When-
ever it is reasonable to ascribe knowledge of a proposition to someone, it is
reasonable to say that the proposition known is highly credible, where the
15 Lewis [14], p. 109. Note that we are using the Principal Principle as a bridge principle in order
to spell out the relation between two kinds of probability, credibility and objective chance. This
use is not meant to suggest that credibility is to be identified with subjective probability as
understood by Lewis.
16 Of course, given our focus on limited cognitive agents (section 2), what we say does not directly
apply to the case of an omniscient being.
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interpretation of ‘highly’ may vary from context to context. For example, if
one knows that 2+2=4, then it is highly credible that 2+2=4; if one knows
that dinosaurs are extinct, then it is highly credible that dinosaurs are extinct,
and so on. More generally,
(KC) If one knows α, then α is highly credible.
Future contingents are no exception in this respect: if one knows that things
will go a certain way, then it is highly credible that things will go that way.
Thus, for example, you know that you will have breakfast tomorrow only
if (1) is highly credible. Certainly, in the context of a discussion on future
contingents it cannot be taken for granted that ‘one knows α’ is true for
some α, provided that knowledge is assumed to be factive, for we have seen
that some views deny that future contingents can be true. However, even if
one endorses such a view, one can still recognize the connection between
knowledge and credibility expressed by (KC).17
A principle similar to (KC) seems to hold for assertibility. Arguably, a
proposition is assertible only if it is highly credible. If it is assertible that
2+2=4, then it is highly credible that 2+2=4; if it is assertible that dinosaurs
are extinct, then it is highly credible that dinosaurs are extinct, and so on.
More generally,
(AC) If α is assertible, then α is highly credible.
Again, future contingents are no exception in this respect: if it is assertible
that things will go a certain way, then it is highly credible that things will go
that way. Thus, for example, (1) is assertible only if it is highly credible. As in
the case of knowledge, in the context of a discussion on future contingents it
cannot be taken for granted that ‘α is assertible’ is true for some α, at least as
long as assertibility is assumed to be factive. However, this does not prevent
(AC) from being compelling.18
The connection between assertibility and credibility expressed by (AC) is
compatible with at least two well-known accounts of the constitutive norm
of assertion. One defines assertibility in terms of justification, by saying that
one must assert α only if one is justified in believing α. The other defines
assertibility in terms of knowledge, by saying that one must assert α only if
one knows α. In both cases (AC) holds because justification and knowledge
entail credibility, although the two accounts differ as to whether assertibility
is factive.19
Note that the converses of (KC) and (AC) are not warranted. The converse
of (KC) is false on the assumption that knowledge is factive, for credibility is
not factive. Our framework can easily account for cases in which α is highly
credible without being known, as in the earthquake scenario discussed above.
In that case, the credibility of (1) does not count per se as knowledge. The
converse of (AC) is also problematic. If assertibility is assumed to be factive,
as in the knowledge account, then we get exactly the same kind of coun-
terexamples. But even if it is not assumed to be factive, as in the justification
account, it is still not obvious that high credibility entails assertibility, because
it is not obvious that high credibility suffices for justification.
17 Iacona [10] advocates the view that future contingents are knowable and shows how we can
make sense of their knowability within an Ockhamist framework. Cariani [3] argues in a similar
spirit that the openness of the future does not prevent future contingents from being knowable.
18 In the most recent literature on future contingents, the issue of assertibility has been widely
discussed, see Belnap, Perloff, and Xu [19], Stojanovic [27], MacFarlane [17], Hattiangadi and
Besson [6], Santelli [26].
19 Lackey [13], Kvanvig [11], and Neta [20] provide different versions of the justification account.
Williamson [33] advocates the knowledge account.
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As a concluding remark, it may be observed that (KC) and (AC) do not
settle the question whether aggregation principles similar to that discussed
in sections 5 and 6 hold for knowledge and assertibility. One might be apt to
think that the following principles hold:
(AK) If one knows α and one knows β, then one knows α ∧ β.
(AA) If α is assertible and β is assertible, then α ∧ β is assertible.
From (KC) and (AK) one would get that credibility is closed under conjunc-
tion insofar as the conjuncts are known: if α and β are highly credible in
virtue of being known, then α ∧ β must be highly credible as well. Similarly,
from (AA) and (AC) one would get that credibility is closed under conjunc-
tion insofar as the conjuncts are assertible: if α and β are highly credible in
virtue of being assertible, then α∧ β must be highly credible as well. But such
conclusions are not inconsistent with the account of credibility suggested
here, for they leave room for the possibility that the cases in which credibility
is not preserved are cases in which the conjuncts are not known or assertible.
The lottery paradox might be used as an illustration of this possibility.
Suppose that 1000 lottery tickets are sold to 1000 persons P1, . . . , P1000. For
each Pn such that 1 ≤ n ≤ 1000, it is highly probable that Pn will not win, so
it seems rational to accept ‘Pn will not win’. But it does not seem rational
to accept the conjunction of the 1000 sentences so constructed, for that
would amount to holding that nobody will win. Our account of credibility
vindicates these two intuitions. Imagine a tree where 1000 branches depart
from a single point, one branch for each possible winner. Each of the 1000
sentences of the form ‘Pn will not win’ is highly credible, for its credibility
value is 0.999. But the conjunction of these sentences is not credible at all, for
its credibility value is 0: in each history, it is false now that nobody will win.
Note, however, that in this case it is far from obvious that each of the 1000
sentences is known or assertible. If it is not, then aggregation fails without
contradicting (AK) or (AA).20
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